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Abstract. Addressing user’s emotions in human-computer interaction
significantly enhances the believability and lifelikeness of virtual humans.
Emotion recognition and interpretation is realized in our approach by in-
tegrating empathy as a designated process within the agent’s cognitive
architecture. In this paper we describe this empathy process which com-
prises of two interconnected components: a belief-desire-intention (BDI)
based cognitive component and an affective component based on the
emotion simulation system of the virtual human Max. The application
and a preliminary evaluation of this empathy system are reported on in
the context of a 3D competitive card game scenario.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Empathy plays a prominent role in human-human interaction because it repre-
sents a motivational basis of prosocial behaviour and contributes to moral acts
like helping, caring and justice [7].
Brave et al. [5] accentuate that empathy is a fundamental and powerful means
to manifest caring in humans. They investigate the psychological impact of affec-
tive agents, which are endowed with the ability to behave empathically. In their
study [5] two conditions were evaluated in which the agent expresses self-oriented
emotions and other-oriented, empathic emotions. Based on online questionnaires,
they found that subjects judge the empathic agent as more likeable, trustworthy
and caring as the self-emotional agent.
Prendiger et al. [9] investigate the impact of the affective virtual human Max
upon humans within a 3D card game on the basis of human player’s physiologi-
cal responses in four different conditions: non-emotional condition, self-centered
condition, negative-empathic condition and positive-empathic condition. It was
found that, first, the absence of negative emotions within a competitive card
game is stress-inducing and, secondly, the valence of the human’s emotion is
congruent with the valence of the emotion expressed by the agent.
These findings demonstrate that realizing empathic agents is important in
human-computer interaction. The authors of these studies primarily investi-
gate the impact of empathic agents upon humans. Their implementations of an
agent’s empathic reactions to human’s emotions, however, are based on simple
heuristics rather than a more detailed analysis of the internal processes involved
in the elicitation of empathy between humans.
Definitions of empathy fall into one of two major categories (cf. [5], [7]): (1)
empathy is defined as an affective reaction to the emotions of others, (2) empathy
is viewed as cognitive understanding of another’s emotions. In our approach we
acknowledge both of these definitions by combining an affective component with
a cognitive component in the cognitive architecture of our virtual human Max.
2 A First Approach for an Empathy System
We have experimentally implemented an empathy system for the virtual human
Max [4]. It is based on the fundamental assumption that Max is quasi-egocentric.
Quasi-egocentrism is observed in two-year-old children [7], who know that em-
pathic emotions are to be ascribed to another individual although being ex-
perienced subjectively. However, due to cognitive limitations they do not yet
understand that others have their own independent inner states and may ap-
praise a given situation differently. These children appraise observed situations
of others in the same way as if they were in that situation themselves.
The architecture of the virtual human Max can be divided into a cognition
module and an emotion module (cf. [8], [3]). Following our understanding of em-
pathy we also divide the empathy system into two interconnected components
(see Figure 1). The cognitive component of the empathy system is characterized
by the cognitive understanding of how emotions occur in humans. This compo-
nent is implemented within the cognition module. The affective component of
the empathy system then assures the simulation of a similar emotion dynamics
for the human as it is generated for Max himself (cf. [1]). As an example scenario
the interactive implementation of the card game Skip-Bo is chosen (cf. [2]). In
this game the agent performs sequences of plans to reach his intended goal of
winning the game. In our realization of empathy the agent generates a hypothesis
about the emotional state of the human player by appraising the game situa-
tion for the human player in the cognitive component. This appraisal is based
on the same mechanism that is used in the agent’s own appraisal processes.
Every human’s action is analyzed by plans that generate the same emotional
impulses (EI in Figure 1) as if Max would perform these actions himself. These
impulses, however, are now driving the hypothesized emotion dynamics of the
human player which is simulated within the emotion module of Max. In this
appraisal processes the agent does not integrate any information concerning the
cognitive state of the human player. Thereby, Max behaves quasi-egocentric and
our approach follows the idea of the situational role-taking as described in [6].
In the affective component the course of emotions and moods over time and
their mutual interaction as well as the mapping to pleasure-arousal-dominance-
space are also modeled for the human player now. Reflecting the assumption that
the agent is quasi-egocentric, we use identical parameters for the human player’s
emotion dynamics as we are using for our virtual human Max. The emotional
state of the human player is represented by two additional reference points in
Fig. 1. Empathy simulation as a combination of cognitive appraisal and affect dy-
namics: The events “Human plays card” and “I play card” trigger appropriate “Plan
Human” and “Plan Me” leading to emotional impulses (EI) for Max himself and the
human player. These two impulses drive two independent emotion dynamics as rep-
resented in the “Emotion module” by their respective white and black circles. After
mapping into pleasure-arousal-dominance-space (PAD-space) an emotion hypothesis
for the human player is derived.
the emotion module as indicated by the two black circles in Figure 1. Thus, Max
always distinguishes between his own and another one’s emotional state. Even
though he might experience fear himself at a given moment during the game, he
might hypothesize at the same time that the human player is happy.
3 A Preliminary Evaluation of the Empathy System
To evaluate our approach to modeling empathy we are currently comparing the
hypothetical arousal values generated by our empathy system with arousal values
we reassigned to the emotion categories provided by the emotion recognition
system of [9].
3.1 Procedure
So far, three of a total of 32 game sessions (sessions 24, 25 and 28) were replayed
in realtime. During replay the empathy system generated an emotion hypothesis
which was analyzed as follows. The emotion recognition system of [9] provided us
with five discreet emotion categories. As these categories are based on a mapping
in valence-arousal-space, we reassigned pleasure and arousal values as shown in
table 1.
Emotion Cat. Pleasure Arousal
Exited 100 100
Joyful 100 50
Relaxed 0 0
Frustrated -100 50
Fearful -100 100
Table 1. The pleasure and arousal values reassigned to the emotion categories provided
by the emotion recognition system of [9]. These values were chosen with respect to the
valence-arousal-space introduced by Lang (cf. [9]).
For our first analysis we concentrated on arousal values, because we assume
the pleasure values derived from biometrical data (cf. [9]) to be much less reliable.
We expected to find similarities between the arousal values generated by our
empathy system on the one hand and reassigned to the emotion categories as
shown in table 1 on the other hand. Figures 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) show the courses
of the two arousal values over time for the subjects 24, 25 and 28, respectively.
The empathy system provides a more continuous course of arousal (EmoHyp)
whereas the remapping of the categorical output of emotion recognition results
in more discreet course of arousal (EmoRec) over time. In order to compare
these values we decided to calculate the mean values (MeanValue) of the arousal
values provided by our empathy system over all intervals, in which the reassigned
arousal values (EmoRec) remained stable.
3.2 Results and Discussion
For a preliminary evaluation we compared the arousal mean values of our empa-
thy system with the reassigned arousal values. For subject 28 (cf. Figure 2(c)) we
found that the relative offsets of the mean values are comparable to the arousal
values of emotion recognition. The mean values corresponding to each interval
increase or decrease together with the reassigned arousal values. However, in case
of the two other subjects (24 and 25) we found less similarities. For example,
in the first interval of Figure 2(b) a mean value of 20 was calculated, while the
emotion recognition value remained zero. During the following interval (240 to
502 seconds) the mean value decreases to 7 although the arousal value of emotion
recognition increases to 50. Nevertheless, we consider this evaluation as accept-
able because some similarities between the two arousal courses could be found.
In order to gain statistically significant results we are currently analysing more
gaming sessions. We also plan to compare the empathy arousal values to the raw
arousal values derived from biometrical data used in the emotion recognition
system of [9] thereby avoiding remapping of emotion categories.
(a) Subject 24
(b) Subject 25
(c) Subject 28
Fig. 2. The arousal courses (EmoHyp and EmoRec) and the mean values (MeanValue).
4 Conclusion
We presented a first realization of empathy for a virtual human Max based on
the conceptual distinction between cognitive and affective empathy. Some as-
pects of cognitive empathy are captured by following the situational role-taking
approach. The consideration of the course of emotions and moods over time and
their mutual interaction in the simulation of the human’s hypothesized emo-
tions reflects aspects of the affective component of empathy. Our next step is
to evaluate this first approach of an empathy system and to also integrate a
cognitive model of the human player to realize an empathy process that follows
the individual role-taking approach (cf. [6]).
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